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In an ID-based universal designated veriﬁer signature scheme, a single signer generates
a signature that can only be veriﬁed by a designated veriﬁer using a simpliﬁed public
identity such as an e-mail address. In this paper, we expand the scheme to a multi-user
setting for generating and verifying signatures in practical applications. An ID-based multi-
signer universal designated multi-veriﬁer signature scheme based on bilinear pairings is
proposed that allows a set of multi-signer to cooperatively generate a signature and
designate a set of multi-veriﬁer to verify it. The security of the proposed scheme is
demonstrated to be resistant to existentially forgery from adaptive chosen-message and
chosen-ID attacks under the Bilinear Diﬃe–Hellman problem.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Paperwork is rapidly being replaced as e-mail, electronic commerce, and electronic monetary transactions become more
widespread. For many of these new forms of communication, a digital signature is essential. In traditional signature schemes
such as RSA [1] and DSA [2], anyone can verify the validity of a signature by using the signer’s public key, and the signer
cannot successfully claim he/she did not sign a message. In numerous applications such as tenders, electronic voting, or
electronic auctions, the public veriﬁcation and non-repudiation properties of a signature are not desired. For an example, in
electronic voting schemes, a voting center seeks to verify that a vote has been properly counted in the ﬁnal tally by means
of the center’s signature on the receipt. Voters must not have the ability to use such receipts to verify the nature of their
votes. Otherwise, it results that the briber believe that the voter indeed votes some candidate according to his/her direction
and then give the obedient voter some gain.
To satisfy the above requirements in electronic voting schemes, the designated veriﬁer signature (DVS) concept was intro-
duced by Jakobsson, Sako, and Impagliazzo [3]. The signature of a message in the DVS scheme is intended to be a special
veriﬁer chosen by the signer, and only the designated veriﬁer is able to verify its validity. This can be viewed as a “light
signature scheme” [4]. No one else than the designated veriﬁer can be convinced of the authenticity of this signature since
the designated veriﬁer himself can simulate the signature which is indistinguishable from the one generated by the signer.
That is, no one can aﬃrm the identity of the signer or the designated veriﬁer who issued the signature. Jakobsson et al.
also introduced a stronger vision of the DVS scheme called strong designated veriﬁer signature (SDVS). In a SDVS scheme, the
designated veriﬁer’s private key is involved in the veriﬁcation phase so that no one else other than the designated veriﬁer
can verify the validity of signature. Later, Saeednia et al. [5] formalized SDVS notation and proposed an eﬃcient scheme.
Steinfeld et al. [6] in Asiacrypt 2003 deﬁned and proposed a new type of DVS scheme called an universal designated
veriﬁer signature (UDVS). It has the same properties as DVS schemes and it also can function as a standard publicly veriﬁable
signature scheme that additionally allows any signature holder (not necessarily the signer) to designate the signature to any
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Hellman (BDH) problem. Simultaneously, they demonstrated how to extend the classical Schnorr or RSA signature schemes
to UDVS schemes [7]. Like SDVS schemes, the designated veriﬁer’s private key in the UDVS schemes is also involved in the
veriﬁcation phase. This is because the veriﬁer’s public key is used in the designated signature generation phase. However,
the SDVS scheme is specially designed for designated veriﬁer signatures, and does not provide an additional function to
convert a publicly veriﬁable signature scheme into a designated veriﬁer signature.
Some fair distributed contract signing and verifying schemes have been designed for use in a multi-user setting. For
multi-veriﬁer settings, Laguillaumie and Vergnaud [8,9] extended DVS notation and developed designated multi-veriﬁer sig-
nature (DVMS). It differs from DVS in that the designated signature is intended to correspond to a speciﬁc set of different
veriﬁers. On the other hand, Ng et al. [10] extended UDVS notation as universal designated multi-veriﬁer signature (UDVMS) to
allow a signature holder to designate the signature to multi-veriﬁer. They proposed two UDVMS schemes based on Steinfeld
et al.’s UDVS scheme. Shailaja et al. [11] and Yang et al. [12] proposed a UDVMS scheme based on the q-Strong Diﬃe–
Hellman assumption and Gap Bilinear Diﬃe–Hellman assumption, respectively. The security of their schemes is proven in
the standard model. For multi-signer settings, Zhang et al. [13] proposed a multi-signer strong designated signature (SMSDVS)
based on the BDH assumption. The designated signature should be collectively generated by multi-signer and with no one
able to verify its validity except the designated veriﬁer. We refer to references [8–13] as providing examples of related work
and applications for multi-user settings.
Most related designated veriﬁer signature schemes are based on a certiﬁcate-based PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) [8–10,
5,7,11,6,12,13]. In certiﬁcate-based designated veriﬁer signature schemes, a user must obtain a certiﬁcate of a long-lived
public key from the CA (Certiﬁcation Authority) and verify its correctness before utilizing the user’s public key. Such
certiﬁcate-based designated veriﬁer signature schemes lead to the problems of certiﬁcate management and the high com-
putational cost of certiﬁcate veriﬁcation. In ID-based systems [14–18], a user’s public key is derived from the identity such
as email addresses, IP address and there is a trusted party KGC (Key Generation Center) that generates the corresponding
private key of the user. Advantageous aspects of an ID-based system include not requiring the public key directories and
simpliﬁed key revocation. Therefore, some ID-based designated veriﬁer signature schemes have been proposed, such as ID-
based universal designated veriﬁer signature (ID-UDVS) [19], ID-based strong designated veriﬁer signature (ID-SDVS) [20–22], and
ID-based universal designated multi-veriﬁer signature (ID-UDVMS) [23].
A designated signature scheme has not yet been developed for both multi-signer settings and multi-veriﬁer settings.
We expand the example presented in [13] to conform to these factors. A group of witnesses want to collectively report an
offence to a prosecutor. To avoid retaliation, a multi-signer designated veriﬁer signature can be used on the on the report
allowing only a designated prosecutor to verify the signature. However, to avoid a briber to canvass a corrupt prosecutor is
necessary. This can be accomplished by distributing the power of verifying a signature in a multi-veriﬁer setting. That is,
a multi-witness designated veriﬁer signature on the report can only be veriﬁed by multi-prosecutors. A multi-user setting
in the designated signature scheme would be best implemented by ID-based systems since more users’ public keys are
involved and used. Moreover, if the scheme has the property “universal," it will be more convenient than strong designated
veriﬁer signature schemes.
In this paper, an ID-based multi-signer universal designated multi-veriﬁer signature (ID-SMUDVMS) scheme is proposed,
which generalizes an ID-UDVS scheme. In the ID-SMUDVMS scheme, all users’ public keys are derived from their identi-
ties simplifying the key management procedures. A publicly veriﬁable signature is cooperatively generated by multi-signer
and any holder of the signature can designate it to any desired multi-veriﬁer by using the veriﬁers’ public keys. Given the
designated signature, the designated multi-veriﬁer can cooperatively verify that the message is signed by the multi-signer
but cannot prove the same fact to a third party. Note that Lipmma et al. [24] identiﬁed a new security property for des-
ignated veriﬁer signatures: the non-delegatability. This means that neither the signer or nor the designated veriﬁer should
able to produce a “meta-key” which allows to generate a new signature without revealing their secret keys. However, the
delegatability is inherent to all related UDVS [25]. Since the proposed ID-SMUDVMS is universal and belongs to UDVS, our
scheme is delegatable. Regardless the numbers of signers and veriﬁers are, the generated signature length of the proposed
ID-SMUDVMS scheme is independent of the number of signers and veriﬁers. The proposed ID-SMUDVMS scheme is secure
against existential forgery under the chosen-message attacks and chosen-ID attacks in the random oracle model assuming
the BDH problem is hard.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Some basic concepts on bilinear pairing are introduced in Section 2.
In Section 3, an ID-SMUDVMS scheme is presented. Section 4 analyzes the security of the proposed ID-SMUDVMS scheme.
The performance of the proposed scheme is presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Admissible bilinear pairings
Let G1 be a cyclic additive group and G2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q for some large prime q.
An admissible bilinear pairing is a map e : G1 × G1 → G2, which satisﬁes the following properties:
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stated as e(P + Q , T ) = e(P , T )e(Q , T ) and e(P , Q + T ) = e(P , Q )e(P , T ) for all P , Q , T ∈ G1.
• Non-degenerate: There exist P , Q ∈ G1 such that e(P , Q ) = 1.
• Computable: There is an eﬃcient algorithm to compute e(P , Q ) for all P , Q ∈ G1.
2.2. Bilinear Diﬃe–Hellman assumption
The security of our scheme relies on the hardness of the Bilinear Diﬃe–Hellman problem.
Bilinear Diﬃe–Hellman parameter generator G . A randomized algorithm G is a bilinear Diﬃe–Hellman parameter generator
if (1) G takes a security parameter κ ∈ Z+ , (2) G runs in polynomial time in κ , and (3) G outputs a κ-bit prime number q,
the description of groups G1,G2 of order q, and the description of an admissible bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2,
G(1κ)= 〈q,G1,G2, e〉.
Bilinear Diﬃe–Hellman (BDH) problem. Let G be a bilinear Diﬃe–Hellman parameter generator to generate 〈q,G1,G2, e〉.
An algorithm A has advantage (κ) in solving the BDH problem for G and a random generator P of G1 if for suﬃciently
large κ :
AdvG,A(κ) = Pr
[A(q,G1,G2, e, P ,aP ,bP , cP ) = e(P , P )abc] (κ),
where the probability is over the random choice of a,b, c ∈ Z∗q , P ∈ G1, and the random bits of A. We say that G sat-
isﬁes the BDH assumption if there is no randomized algorithm A that can solve the BDH problem with a non-negligible
advantage (κ).
3. ID-based multi-signers universal designated multi-veriﬁers signature
In this section, we present an ID-based multi-signer universal designated multi-veriﬁer signature (ID-SMUDVMS) scheme,
which consists of eight algorithms: setup algorithm Setup, extract algorithm Extract, ID-based individual signature generation
algorithm ID-S, ID-based individual signature public veriﬁcation algorithm ID-SPV, ID-based multi-signer signature genera-
tion algorithm ID-SM , ID-based multi-signer signature public veriﬁcation algorithm ID-SMPV, ID-based universal designated
multi-veriﬁer signature generation algorithm ID-UDVM , ID-based universal designated multi-veriﬁer signature veriﬁcation
algorithm ID-UDVMV.
Setup: KGC runs BDH parameter generator G to generate a prime q, two groups G1 and G2 of order q, and an admis-
sible bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2. KGC chooses a random generator P ∈ G1, a random s ∈ Z∗q , and set Ppub = sP .
Then, KGC keeps s as the master secret key and publishes system parameters params = 〈q,G1,G2, e, P , Ppub, H1, H2〉, where
H1 : {0,1}∗ → G1 and H2 : {0,1}∗ → Z∗q are cryptographic hash functions.
Extract: Given an identity ID, KGC computes the public key Q ID = H1(ID) and the private key S ID = sQ ID, and returns S ID to
the user with identity ID.
ID-S: Let S = {IDSi, i = 1, . . . ,n} be a set of signers’ identities, each signer performs the following steps to generate his
individual signature on a message m:
(1) Choose a random ri ∈ Z∗q to compute
Ui = ri H1(IDSi), (1)
and then broadcast Ui to other co-signers.
(2) Compute
U =
n∑
i=1
Ui, (2)
h = H2(m,U ), (3)
Vi = (ri + h)S IDSi . (4)
The ID-based individual signature (ID-S signature) on the message m is σi = (Ui, Vi,U ).
ID-SPV: Given the system parameters params, a message m, a ID-S signature σi = (Ui, Vi,U ), check if
e(Vi, P )
?= e(Ui + H2(m,U )H1(IDSi), Ppub). (5)
If it holds, then the ID-S signature is valid and output accepted; otherwise, output is rejected.
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V =
n∑
i=1
Vi . (6)
The ID-based multi-signer signature (ID-SM signature) on the message m is σ = (U , V ).
ID-SMPV: Given the system parameter params, a message m, a ID-SM signature σ = (U , V ), check if
e(V , P )
?= e
(
U + H2(m,U )
(
n∑
i=1
H1(IDi)
)
, Ppub
)
. (7)
If it holds, then output accepted; otherwise, output rejected.
ID-UDVM: Let V = {IDV j, j = 1, . . . , l} be a set of veriﬁers’ identities. Given a set V and a message-signature pair (m, σ ),
compute
V DV = e
(
V ,
l∑
j=1
H1(IDV j)
)
. (8)
The universal designated multi-veriﬁer signature (ID-UDVM signature) on the message m is σ DV = (U , V DV ). This algo-
rithm ID-UDVM functions the publicly veriﬁable multi-signer signature σ = (U , V ) to allow any holder of the signature can
designate it to any multi-veriﬁer.
ID-UDVMV: Given a set S of signers’ public keys, a set V of veriﬁers’s private keys, and a message-signature pair (m,σ DV ),
check if
V DV
?=
l∏
j=1
e
(
U + H2(m,U )
(
n∑
i=1
H1(IDSi)
)
, S IDV j
)
. (9)
If it holds, then output accept; otherwise, output reject.
It can be seen that the lengths of the generated signatures in algorithms ID-SM and ID-UDVM are independent of the
number of signers and veriﬁers. Next, we show the completeness of the ID-SMUDVMS scheme with regard to algorithms
ID-SPV, ID-SMPV, ID-UDVMV.
Theorem 3.1. In algorithm ID-SPV, the ID-S signature σi = (Ui, Vi,U ) on the message m can be veriﬁed using Eq. (5).
Proof.
e(Vi, P ) = e
(
(ri + h)S IDSi , P
)
by Eq. (4)
= e((ri + h)Q IDSi , Ppub) by bilinear property
= e(ri H1(IDSi) + hH1(IDSi), Ppub)
= e(Ui + H2(m,U )H2(IDSi), Ppub) by Eq. (1). 
Theorem 3.2. In algorithm ID-SMPV, the ID-SM signature σ = (U , V ) on the message m can be veriﬁed using Eq. (7).
Proof.
e(V , P ) = e
(
n∑
i=1
Vi, P
)
by Eq.(6)
= e
(
n∑
i=1
(ri + h)S IDSi , P
)
by Eq. (4)
= e
(
n∑
i=1
(ri + h)Q IDSi , Ppub
)
by bilinear property
= e
(
n∑
i=1
ri H1(IDSi) + h
n∑
i=1
H1(IDSi), Ppub
)
= e
(
U + h
n∑
i=1
H1(IDSi), Ppub
)
by Eq. (2). 
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Proof.
V DV = e
(
V ,
l∑
j=1
H1(IDV j)
)
by Eq. (8)
=
l∏
j=1
e
(
V , H1(IDV j)
)
by bilinear property
=
l∏
j=1
e
(
n∑
i=1
(ri + h)S IDSi , H1(IDV j)
)
by Eqs. (4), (6)
=
l∏
j=1
e
(
n∑
i=1
(ri + h)H1(IDSi), S IDV j
)
by bilinear property
=
l∏
j=1
e
(
U + H2(m,U )
(
n∑
i=1
H1(IDSi)
)
, S IDV j
)
by Eq. (1) and Eq. (2). 
4. Security analysis
The ID-S signatures are secure has been proved by Lin et al. [26], which is equivalent to the signature in Cha–Cheon
scheme [27] under the assumption of a one-way hash function H1. For the message m, combining n ID-S signatures
σi = (Ui, Vi,U ) into a ID-SM signature σ = (U , V ), is the same as the Cha–Cheon signature if the public key Q ID is treated
as:
∑n
i=1 H1(IDSi). Their scheme has been proved secure against existential forgery under the chosen-message attacks and
chosen-ID attacks in the random oracle model assuming the BDH problem is hard in groups generated by G . Due to limi-
tations of space, in this paper we omit the detailed descriptions of those proofs here. We directly prove the unforgeability
and non-transferability of ID-SMUDVMS as follows.
Theorem 4.1 (Unforgeability). In the random oracle model, the proposed ID-based multi-signer universal designated multi-veriﬁer
signature scheme ID-SMUDVMS = (Setup, Extract, ID-S, ID-SPV, ID-SM , ID-SMPV, ID-UDVM , ID-UDVMV) is existentially unforgeable
against an adaptively chosen-message and chosen-ID attacker under the BDH assumption. Concretely, suppose there exists an adversary
A who has an advantage A(κ) in attacking ID-SMUDVMS. Then there exists an algorithm B that solves the BDH problem generated
by G with an advantage B(κ) at least:
B(κ) A(κ) · 2
qH1(qH1 − 1)
.
Proof. Algorithm B is given as inputting the BDH parameters 〈q,G1,G2, e〉 generated by G and a random instance
〈P ,aP ,bP , cP 〉 of the BDH problem for these parameters. B is to inject the above 〈P ,aP ,bP , cP 〉 during the simulation,
and to compute e(P , P )abc .
• Setup: B creates the ID-SMUDVMS parameters params = 〈q, G1, G2, e, P , Ppub , H1, H2〉 by setting Ppub = aP . Here H1,
H2 are two random oracles controlled by B. To avoid collision and consistently respond to hash queries, B maintains
two lists listH1 and listH2 which are initially empty. B returns the same output for identical inputs in hash queries. That
is, B ﬁrst checks the existence before creating a new output.
• H1(IDi): Assume A makes at most qH1 distinct queries to H1, B then chooses j,k ∈ [1,qH1 ] uniformly at random. When
A makes an H1(IDi) query, B maintains listH1 as follows:
– If i = j, let ID∗S = IDi at this point. B returns bP and adds 〈ID∗S,⊥,bP 〉 to listH1 .
– If i = k, let ID∗V = IDi at this point. B returns cP and adds 〈ID∗V,⊥, cP 〉 to listH1 .
– Otherwise, B picks a random ti ∈ Z∗q and returns ti P , and add 〈IDi, ti, ti P 〉 to listH1 .
• H2(mi,U i): When A makes an H2(mi,U i) query, B picks a random hi ∈ Z∗q , returns hi , and adds 〈mi,U i,hi〉 to listH2 .• Extract(IDi): When A makes an Extract(IDi) query, if IDi = ID∗S and IDi = ID∗V, B ﬁnds the tuple of the form 〈IDi, ti, ti P 〉
and returns tiaP . Otherwise B reports failure and terminates. It is reasonable to assume that A asked for H1(IDi) before
issuing Extract(IDi) queries.
• ID-SM(Si,mi): When A makes an ID-SM(Si,mi) query of a set of identities Si and a message mi , B returns a ID-SM
signature σ i = (U i, V i) as follows. First, B chooses a random hi ∈ Z∗q for an ID-SM(Si,mi) query. For each IDα in Si , B
chooses a random rα ∈ Z∗q .
– If IDα = ID∗S and IDα = ID∗V, B ﬁnds the tuples of the form 〈IDα, tα, tα P 〉 in listH1 , and then computes Uα = rαtα P ,
Vα = (rα + hi)tαaP .
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– If IDα = ID∗V, B computes Uα = rα P − hicP , Vα = rαaP .
Then, B combines ID-S signatures to a ID-SM signature σ i = (U i, V i), where U i =∑IDα∈Si Uα and V i =∑IDα∈Si Vα .
Finally, B returns σ i = (U i, V i) and adds 〈mi,U i,hi〉 to listH2 .
Eventually, A outputs a valid ID-UDVM signature (St = {IDS1, . . . , IDSn}t , Vt = {IDV1, . . . , IDVl}t ,mt, σ DVt ) where St and
Vt are the sets of identities to be selected by A. If IDSi = ID∗S ∈ St and IDVi = ID∗V ∈ Vt , B reports failure and terminates.
Otherwise by replaying of B with the same random type but different choice of a random set for H2-queries. As in the
forking lemma argument of [28], B gets two ID-UDVM signatures (St ,Vt ,mt,σ DVt ) and (St ,Vt ,m′t,σ ′DVt ) which are expected
to be valid with respect to different h = h′ , where σ DVt = (Ut , V DVt ), V DVt = e(V t ,
∑
IDVi∈Vt Q IDVi ), σ
′
DVt
= (Ut , V ′DVt ),
V ′DVt = e(V ′t,
∑
IDVi∈Vt Q IDVi ). B computes the following equations to get e(P , P )abc:
V DVt
e(Ut + h∑IDSi∈St Q IDSi ,∑IDVi∈Vt ,IDVi =ID∗V S IDVi ) = e(V t, Q ID∗V),
V ′DVt
e(Ut + h′∑IDSi∈St Q IDSi ,∑IDVi∈Vt ,IDVi =ID∗V S IDVi ) = e
(
V ′t, Q ID∗V
)
,
(e(V t, Q ID∗V)
e(V ′t, Q ID∗V)
)(h−h′)−1
= e
((
h − h′) ∑
IDSi∈St
S IDSi , Q ID∗V
)(h−h′)−1
= e
( ∑
IDSi∈St
S IDSi , Q ID∗V
)
,
e(
∑
IDSi∈St S IDSi , Q ID∗V)
e(
∑
IDSi∈St ,IDSi =ID∗S S IDSi , Q ID∗V)
= e(S ID∗S , Q ID∗V) = e(abP , cP ) = e(P , P )abc.
If algorithm B does not abort during the simulation then algorithm A’s view is identical to its view in the real attack.
The responses to H1-queries and H2-queries are as in the real attack, since each response is uniformly and independently
distributed in G1 and Z∗q respectively. The responses to Extract-queries are valid since tiaP = aQ IDi = S IDi . The responses
σ i = (U i, V i) to ID-SM-queries are valid, which can pass the veriﬁcation equation (7). Obviously, if all identities in Si such
that IDα = ID∗S and IDα = ID∗V, B knows the corresponding secret key tα , and computes the values Uα and Vα following
Eq. (1) and Eq. (4) respectively. It is obvious that the combined values U i and V i can pass the veriﬁcation equation. If one
of identities in Si such that IDα = ID∗S , i.e., Si = {ID1, ID2, . . . , IDn}i , ID1 = ID∗S, ID2 = ID∗S, . . . , IDn = ID∗S . The combined values
U i = r1P − hibP + r2t2P + · · · + rntn P and V i = r1aP + (r2 + hi)t2aP + · · · + (rn + hi)tnaP still can pass Eq. (7) as follows.
e(V i, P ) = e
(
r1aP + (r2 + hi)t2aP + · · · + (rn + hi)tnaP , P
)
= e(r1P + (r2 + hi)t2P + · · · + (rn + hi)tn P , Ppub)
= e(r1P + r2t2P + · · · + rntn P + hi(t2P + · · · + tn P ), Ppub)
= e(U i + hibP + hi(t2P + · · · + tn P ), Ppub)
= e(U + hi(H1(ID1) + · · · + H1(IDn)), Ppub).
For the same derivation, if one of the identities in Si is such that IDα = ID∗V, then the signature σ i = (U i, V i) will pass the
veriﬁcation.
Now the probability that B does not abort during the simulation should be assessed. The number of identity pairs is:(
qH1
2
)
= qH1 !
2!(qH1 − 2)!
,
= qH1(qH1 − 1)
2
.
Among those
qH1 (qH1−1)
2 pairs, at least one pair (ID
∗
S, ID
∗
V) of them will never be the subject of a key extraction query
from A. Then, with a probability greater than 2qH1 (qH1−1) , A will not ask the queries Extract(ID
∗
S) and Extract(ID
∗
V). Clearly
B’s advantage B(κ) for solving the BDH problem is the product of A’s advantage A(κ) and the probability that A asks
Extract queries on (ID∗S, ID∗V). Hence the advantage B(κ)  A(κ) · 2qH1 (qH1−1) . Therefore, if a forger breaks ID-S
MUDVMS,
then an attacker can solve the BDH problem. 
Theorem 4.2 (Non-transferability). The proposed ID-based multi-signer universal designated multi-veriﬁer signature scheme
ID-SMUDVMS achieves the non-transferability (source hiding). That is, each designated veriﬁer cannot convince anyone of the au-
thenticity of the ID-UDVM signature σ DV = (U , V DV ) on the message m, even if all private keys are revealed.
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can always produce a valid ID-UDVM signature σ ′DV = (U ′, V ′DV ) on the message m as follows:
(1) Choose r′1, r′2, . . . , r′n ∈ Z∗q at random and compute U ′ =
∑n
i=1 r′i H1(IDSi).
(2) Each designated veriﬁer computes
e j = e
(
U ′ + H2
(
m,U ′
)( n∑
i=1
H1(IDSi)
)
, S IDV j
)
,
and
V ′DV =
l∏
j=1
e
(
U ′ + H2
(
m,U ′
)( n∑
i=1
H1(IDSi)
)
, S IDV j
)
The ID-UDVM signature σ ′DV = (U ′, V ′DV ) on the message m passes algorithm ID-UDVMV:
V ′DV =
l∏
j=1
e
(
U ′ + H2
(
m,U ′
)( n∑
i=1
H1(IDSi)
)
, S IDV j
)
= e
(
U ′ + H2
(
m,U ′
)( n∑
i=1
H1(IDSi)
)
,
l∑
j=1
S IDV j
)
= e
(
n∑
i=1
r′i H1(IDSi) + H2
(
m,U ′
)( n∑
i=1
H1(IDSi)
)
,
l∑
j=1
S IDV j
)
= e
(
n∑
i=1
r′i S IDSi + h′
(
n∑
i=1
H1(IDSi)
)
,
l∑
j=1
Q IDV j
)
= e
(
V ′,
l∑
j=1
H1(IDV j)
)
.
So given a message m, the distribution of σ ′DV = (U ′, V ′DV ) is perfectly indistinguishable from that of σ DV = (U , V DV ). It
is unconditionally infeasible to determine who the original signers S and the designated veriﬁers V generate this signature,
even if all private keys are revealed. Thus, the proposed ID-SMUDVMS achieves non-transferability. 
5. Performance evaluation
The proposed ID-SMUDVMS scheme is a new model under multi-signer/multi-veriﬁer settings that is different from other
schemes. Obviously, the ID-SMUDVMS scheme is a generalized version of ID-based universal designated veriﬁer signature
schemes, which includes one singer/one veriﬁer settings, one singer/multi-veriﬁer settings, multi-signer/one veriﬁer set-
ting, and multi-signer/multi-veriﬁer setting. For facilitating the performance evaluation of our scheme, we ﬁrst deﬁne the
following notations:
T P the time for computing one pairing operation.
TH1 the time for mapping an identity to an element in G1
(map-to-point operation) by H1.
TH2 the time for computing a hash value in Z
∗
q by H2.
TM the time for computing one ordinary scalar multiplication in G1.
T A the time for computing point addition on G1.
TMM the time for computing one modular multiplication.
TMA the time for computing one modular addition.
The time for performing the modular addition, the point addition, and the modular multiplication is low as compared
to that of those performing the above operations. Note that the computation of pairing operations is most time-consuming,
and has no thing to do with the number of signers and the number of veriﬁers. Assume that the bit length in G2 is |G2|
and in q is |q|. The detailed evaluation of the proposed scheme with n signers and l veriﬁers is listed in Table 1. That is, the
proposed scheme can be practically implemented.
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Computational costs and signature lengths for the proposed ID-SMUDVMS scheme.
Signature generation phase
ID-S ID-SPV ID-SM ID-SMPV
2TM + TH1 + (n − 1)T A + TH2 + TMA 2T P + T A + TH2 + TM + TH1 (n − 1)T A 2T P + nT A + TH2 + TM + nTH1
Signature veriﬁcation phase
ID-UDVM ID-UDVMV
T P + lT H1 + (l − 1)T A nT A + TH2 + TM + nTH1 + T P + (l − 1)TMM
Signature lengths
ID-S ID-SM ID-UDVM
3|q| 2|q| |q| + |G2|
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we presented an ID-based multi-signer universal designated multi-veriﬁer signature scheme that gener-
alizes the basic ID-based universal designated veriﬁer signature schemes for more applications. We employ the ID-based
cryptography to simplify the key management procedures. Through the multi-user setting is in the scheme, the signature
length is independent of the number of signers and veriﬁers. Concerning the BDH problem, this study has demonstrated
that the proposed scheme is provably secure against existential forgery under the chosen-message attacks and chosen-ID
attacks in the random oracle model.
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